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THE HAGUE CONVENTION  
ON CHOICE-OF-COURT AGREEMENTS:  
IS THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION  
HELPING CLICK-AWAY THE SECURITY OF 
NON-NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
n June 30, 2005, the United States and sixty-three other Member 
States1 at the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
(“HCPIL”)2 signed a Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
(“Convention”).3 If ratified by the U.S.,4 the Convention will control the 
                                                                                                             
 1. In addition to the United States, the current Member States of the Hague Confer-
ence are: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The for-
mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela. Hague Conference on Private International Law 
Frequently Asked Questions 4[d], http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=faq.details 
&fid=6 (last visited May 16, 2007). 
 2. The “Hague Conference on Private International Law” is not an event, but is an 
intergovernmental organization whose goal is “to work for the progressive unification of 
the rules of private international law,” primarily through negotiation and drafting of mul-
tilateral treaties, also called “Hague Conventions.” Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law Frequently Asked Questions 2[b], http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php? 
act=faq.details&fid=32 (last visited Oct. 2, 2005). The Hague Conventions cover a wide 
range of topics including: determinations of applicable law, conflicts of jurisdiction, rec-
ognition, and administrative and judicial co-operation between authorities. Id. 
 3. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements, June 30, 2005, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.pdf 
&cid=9835 (last visited Oct. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Convention]. The Convention is the 
result of negotiations that began in 1992 at the request of the United States that the 
HCPIL negotiate a multilateral convention on the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments. Peter H. Pfund, The Project of the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law to Prepare a Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition/Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 24 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 7, 8 (1998) (citing 
letter from Edwin D. Williamsons, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, to George 
Droz, Secretary General, The Hague Conference on Private International Law (May 5, 
1992)). In 1999, the HCIL produced a Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction on 
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. Hague Conference on Private In-
ternational Law, Prelim. Draft Convention on Jurisdiction on Foreign Judgments in Civil 
and Com. Matters, Prel. Doc. No. 11, Aug. 2000, http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/ 
jdgmpd11.pdf (last visited Oct. 2. 2005) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft]. However, after 
O 
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recognition and enforcement of exclusive5 forum-selection clauses in 
business-to-business civil and commercial transactions.6 It will require 
that legal judgments on cross-border disputes involving contracts con-
taining an exclusive choice-of-court clause be honored and enforced in 
other signature States.7 For example, under the Convention, if an Ameri-
can and a Belgian company agreed in a contract that all disputes arising 
under the contract would be brought in the U.S., then the Belgian com-
pany could not file suit or seek an alternative judgment in Belgium. If a 
U.S. court then ruled in favor of the American company, the courts in 
                                                                                                             
further revisions, it became apparent that the scope of the draft convention was too broad 
and that agreement on the draft convention could not be met. Hague Conference on Pri-
vate Int’l. L., Draft Report on the Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, Prel. Doc. No. 
26, Intro., para. 6, Dec. 24, 2004, http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd26e.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Draft Report]. In 2002, the conference was redirected to 
focus on narrower bases of jurisdiction. Id. By 2003, the focus of the Convention was 
solely on exclusive choice of court agreements in business-to-business contracts. See id. 
 4. Article 27 of the Convention states that ratification, acceptance, approval, or ac-
cession is required for adoption of the Convention and that the instrument used for adop-
tion must be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prior to the entry into force of 
the Convention. Convention, supra note 3, art. 27. If the U.S. decides to agree to the 
Convention then it will have to be ratified by a 2/3 majority of the Senate. U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See also International News Section, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Vol. 6, 
No. 136, (Warren Pub. Inc., D.C.) July 15, 2005. 
 5. Convention, supra note 3, art. 1(1). Under the Convention a choice-of-court 
clause is “exclusive” where the courts of only one country are designated as the chosen 
forum for any litigation arising out of the agreement. See Ronald A. Brand, A Global 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 10 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 345, 347 
(2004); See also Convention, supra note 3, art. 3. This differs from the U.S. common law 
practice in construing choice-of-court provisions as non-exclusive unless the parties indi-
cate otherwise. Peter D. Trooboff, Choice-of-Court Clauses, 27 THE NAT’L L. J. 13 
(ALM, New York, N.Y.), Oct. 17, 2005. Under the Convention, choice-of-court clauses 
are deemed “exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise.” Conven-
tion, supra note 3, art. 3. Article 22 of the Convention allows States to designate that they 
will also recognize non-exclusive choice-of-court agreements. Id. art. 22. 
 6. Convention, supra note 3, arts. 1–2. The terms “civil” and “commercial” are used 
in the Convention out of habit; they have been used in Hague Conventions since 1896. 
See Preliminary Draft, supra note 3, at 29–30. The terms have never been defined, but it 
is agreed that some matters that would be considered civil or commercial in some coun-
tries are outside the scope of the convention. Id. These include: status and legal capacity 
of natural persons, family law matters, wills and succession, carriage of passengers or 
goods by sea, nuclear liability, rights in rem in immovable property, certain questions 
relating to legal persons (corporations), and some issues concerning certain intellectual 
property rights. Draft Report, supra note 3, para. 15. 
 7. See Draft Report, supra note 3. Use of the word “State” in this Note refers to 
foreign countries rather than a domestic “state.” 
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Belgium would generally be required to recognize and enforce the judg-
ment.8 
Without the Convention, however, it is unclear whether the Belgian le-
gal system in the example above would recognize and enforce the U.S. 
judgment. While the U.S. has generally been willing to enforce foreign 
judgments in international business-to-business contract disputes,9 many 
foreign governments are skeptical of the U.S. legal system because they 
believe U.S. juries award excessive punitive damages.10 Thus, foreign 
courts are frequently reluctant to enforce American court judgments, 
leaving U.S. companies involved in such disputes with few remedies.11 
The adoption of the Convention will greatly benefit U.S. companies by 
providing clarity and harmonization in international business-to-business 
transactions by ensuring recognition and enforcement of exclusive 
choice-of-court agreements and the resulting foreign judgments. 
While it may seem that the Convention is a “win-win” situation for the 
U.S., it is not without controversy among some American companies and 
organizations.12 The simplicity of the Convention is made complex be-
cause it also covers exclusive choice-of-court agreements in non-
negotiated contracts,13 such as online “click-wrap”14 agreements and 
                                                                                                             
 8. See Convention, supra note 3, art. 8. See generally Part II infra for discussion of 
exceptions. 
 9. The leading precedent on U.S. recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
is Hilton v. Guyot. 159 U.S. 113 (1895). There, the United States Supreme Court held 
that while no state is obligated to give effect to foreign judgments, the U.S. courts should 
recognize foreign judgments under the notion of comity. See id. at 163–64. Comity is the 
principle “to which the law of one nation, as put in force within its territory … shall be 
allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation.” Id. 
 10. See Kristen Hudson Clayton, Comment, The Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdic-
tion and Enforcement of Judgments and the Internet — A New Jurisdictional Framework, 
36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 223, 228 (2002); Andrew C. Schneider, New Treaty Will Help 
Firms Operate Abroad, KIPLINGER BUS. FORECASTS (Kiplinger Wash. Editors, Inc.), Oct. 
10, 2005, available at http://www.kiplingerforecasts/com/home/stories/new_treaty_will_ 
help_firms_operate_ abroad.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2005). 
 11. Schneider, supra note 10. A U.S. company has three basic options: (1) accept the 
breach of contract despite the loss it entails, (2) hire counsel and dispute the matter over-
seas, or (3) submit the matter to arbitration. Id. 
 12. See Delegates Sign Convention on Choice of Courts, Await Report, 19 WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. REP. (BNA Int’l., D.C.), Aug. 2005, at 17 [hereinafter Delegates Sign Con-
vention]; Schneider, supra note 10. 
 13. By not including non-negotiated contracts under the Article 2(2) exclusions, the 
Convention necessarily includes non-negotiated contracts. See Convention, supra note 3, 
art. 2(2). Article 2(2) provides: 
This Convention shall not apply to the following matters: 
a) the status and legal capacity of natural persons; 
1106 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:3 
“shrink-wrap”15 agreements.16 This is of special concern because of the 
increased prevalence of non-negotiated contracts for information goods 
                                                                                                             
b) maintenance obligations; 
c) other family law matters, including matrimonial property regimes and other 
rights or obligations arising out of marriage or similar relationships; 
d) wills and succession; 
e) insolvency, composition and analogous matters; 
f) the carriage of passengers and goods; 
g) marine pollution, limitation of liability for maritime claims, general average, 
and emergency towage and salvage; 
h) anti-trust (competition) matters; 
i) liability for nuclear damage; 
j) claims for personal injury brought by or on behalf of natural persons; 
k) tort or delict claims for damage to tangible property that do not arise from a 
contractual relationship; 
l) rights in rem in immovable property, and tenancies of immovable property; 
m) the validity, nullity, or dissolution of legal persons, and the validity of deci-
sions of their organs; 
n) the validity of intellectual property rights other than copyright and related 
rights; 
o) infringement of intellectual property rights other than copyright and related 
rights, except where infringement proceedings are brought for breach of a con-
tract between the parties relating to such rights, or could have been brought for 
breach of that contract; 
p) the validity of entries in public registers. 
Id. art. 2(2). 
 14. Click-wrap refers to agreements that appear on a computer screen and require a 
user to click a “yes” or “I agree” button to assent to the terms and conditions before view-
ing the website, installing software or purchasing a product from the website. See Terry J. 
Ilardi, Mass Licensing—Part 1: Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps and Browsewraps, in PAT., & 
HIGH TECHNOLOGY LICENSING 2005, at 253, 256 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks and 
Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 5939, 2005); Delegates Sign Convention, 
supra note 12, at 17. See also Part III.B infra. 
 15. Shrink-wrap licenses are license terms that are contained on or inside a software 
box. Mitchell Waldman, Enforceability of “Clickwrap” or “Shrinkwrap” Agreements, 
NTS AM. JUR. 2D COMPUTERS AND THE INTERNET § 16 (2005). Acceptance of the terms is 
generally indicated by failure to return the software within a designated period of time. 
Ilardi, supra note 14, at 256. 
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and services.17 By including non-negotiated contracts, buyers of online 
software and other services that use non-negotiated terms will be subject 
to the seller’s choice of forum. 
The concern by groups such as libraries, nonprofit organizations, Inter-
net Service Providers, and telecommunications companies who oppose 
the current Convention18 is that they will be forced to defend themselves 
in a foreign jurisdiction or be subject to a default judgment.19 In either 
case, should judgment result in favor of the seller, the U.S could then be 
obligated to enforce the judgment, regardless of whether the outcome of 
the case would have been the same in the U.S.20 Furthermore, these 
groups believe the inclusion of non-negotiated contracts will enable 
                                                                                                             
 16. Delegates Sign Convention, supra note 12, at 17; Dugie Standeford, After 13-Year 
Odyssey, Hague Judgments Treaty Moves Toward Ratification, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, 
Vol. 6, No. 133 (Warren Pub. Inc.), July 12, 2005. 
 17. See id.; see also, Letter from Robert Oakley, Wash. Aff. Rep., Am. Ass’n of L. 
Libraries; Miriam Nisbet, Legis. Couns., Am. Library Ass’n.; and Prudence S. Adler, 
Assoc. Exec. Dir., Ass’n. of Res. Libraries to Jeffrey Kovar, Assistant Legal Advisor for 
Private Int’l. L. (April 22, 2005) [hereinafter Robert Oakley Letter] (on file with author), 
available at http://www.ala.org/ala/washoff/WOissues/copyrightb/intlcopyright/ Ha-
gueCmnts0405.pdf (last visited Oct 4. 2005). Libraries are one of the groups that have 
voiced concern over the inclusion of non-negotiated contracts because for many libraries 
most of their transactions involve non-negotiated contracts. Id. 
 18. Sarah Lai Stirland, Lobbying: Group Urges Rejection of Treaty on Cross-Border 
Disputes, NAT’L J. TECH. DAILY (Nat’l J. Group, Inc.) June 15, 2005. Some organizations 
that have opposed the inclusion of non-negotiated contracts include: the American Asso-
ciation of Law Libraries, American Library Association, AT&T, BellSouth, the Com-
puter Communications Industry Association, MCI, SBC Communications, the U.S. Inter-
net Industry Association, the US Internet Service Provider Assoc. and Verizon Commu-
nications. Id. The main fear of libraries is that a non-negotiated contract will prohibit 
copyright privileges which libraries currently enjoy, such as making copies for preserva-
tion and inter-library loan. See Robert Oakley Letter, supra note 17. A foreign court 
might permit these terms whereas a U.S. court might find them preempted by the Copy-
right Act. Id. 
 19. Jason Krause, Concerns Over Clickwrap, ABA J. E-REPORT (Am. Bar Assoc.), 
June 3, 2005. Another concern is that consumers might be considered businesses in some 
circumstances because the definition of consumer under the Convention is very narrow. 
See International News Section, supra note 4. The current definition of consumer under 
the Convention is: “a natural person acting primarily for personal, family or household 
purposes.” Convention, supra note 3, art. 2. A prior report of the draft convention stated 
that the reason that consumers are not covered is because some legal systems have rules 
that do not allow proceedings over consumers to be brought in a foreign state. Draft Re-
port, supra note 3, art. 2, para. 17. 
 20. See Robert Oakley Letter, supra note 17. The Convention does not permit a court 
to refuse to recognize or enforce a foreign court judgment on the basis that the court be-
ing requested to recognize or enforce the judgment would have decided the case differ-
ently. Convention, supra note 3, art. 8. 
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companies to essentially forum shop around the world because the draf-
ter of the forum-selection clause can choose the State with the most fa-
vorable laws as the exclusive forum and have confidence that it will be 
enforced.21 Moreover, critics are concerned that click-wrap agreements 
could result in businesses unknowingly22 contracting away rights that 
they normally would have had under U.S. copyright law, such as lending 
or fair use rights.23 
Software and publishing companies who support the Convention ar-
gued during drafting that it was “unprecedented to exclude a contract 
because of its form”24 and since no definition of “non-negotiated con-
tract” exists in U.S. law, it would have had to be created from scratch.25 
Jeffrey Kovar, the U.S. Department of State Advisor for Private Interna-
tional Law who is also the U.S. negotiator for the Convention, believes 
that the Convention is “not a workable forum to create new innovations 
in American law” and that he hoped to maintain the “status quo” in areas 
that are “not resolved under U.S. law.”26 Besides arguing that excluding 
non-negotiated contracts was unrealistic, supporters also point to the 
Convention’s so-called “escape clauses,” which allow non-chosen courts 
to exercise jurisdiction or refuse to recognize or enforce jurisdiction on 
the grounds of “manifest injustice” or that the agreement is “manifestly 
contrary to public policy,”27 as reasons to keep non-negotiated contracts  
                                                                                                             
 21. See Krause, supra note 19; Businesses Want Clickwrap Contracts Explicitly Ex-
cluded from Convention, WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP., Vol. 19, No. 6 (BNA Int’l., D.C.), 
June 2005, at 16; Delegates Could Finalize Hague Treaty Next Month, WASH. INTERNET 
DAILY, Vol. 5, No. 43 (Warren Pub. Inc.), Mar. 4, 2004. 
 22. The term “unknowingly” is used because it is said that few people actually read 
click-wrap agreements. See Krause, supra note 19. 
 23. See Drew Clark, E-Commerce: Groups Restate Objections To Treaty For Busi-
ness; Disputes, NATIONAL J. TECH. DAILY (Nat’l J. Group, Inc.), Mar. 5, 2004; Dugie 
Standeford, E-Commerce Off Front Burner: Intellectual Property Issues Continue to Roil 
Treaty Talks, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Vol. 6, No. 49 (Warren Pub. Inc.), March 14, 
2005. 
 24. Delegates Sign Convention, supra note 12, at 17. Presumably this is because his-
torically treaties have only excluded contracts based on their subject matter rather than 
form. 
 25. Krause, supra note 19. 
 26. Id. It seems that there is a fear that if the Convention changes U.S. law then the 
U.S. would not ratify it, thus negotiators are trying to keep the Convention in line with 
American law in order to increase the chances of ratification. See id. 
 27. See Convention, supra note 3, arts. 6(c), 9(e). See infra Part III for discussion of 
the public policy exception. The article 6 “escape clauses” state: 
A court of a Contracting State other than that of the chosen court shall suspend 
or dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies 
unless – a) the agreement is null and void under the law of the State of the cho-
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within the scope of the Convention.28 They feel that the “escape clauses” 
are enough protection to alleviate the critics concerns.29 
With the inclusion of non-negotiated contracts in the final draft, the 
software and publishing industries have accomplished their objective, but 
in order for them to succeed completely the Convention will have to be 
adopted by the U.S. and other States. If adopted, U.S. businesses and 
organizations will have to look elsewhere in order to get relief from en-
forcement of non-negotiated contracts containing choice-of-court claus-
es. Part II of this Note provides a summary of the key clauses within the 
Convention. Part III.A. of this Note examines U.S. public policy juris-
prudence to determine whether this exception is likely to be a realistic 
safe guard for businesses and organizations at-risk by the inclusion of 
non-negotiated contracts.30 Part III.B. looks at U.S. jurisprudence in con-
text with domestic click-wrap and shrink-wrap agreements containing 
forum-selection clauses. Part III.C. concludes that based on prior case 
law, the public policy exception is unlikely to be a realistic safe guard for 
libraries, non-profits, and other businesses who are at-risk by the inclu-
sion of non-negotiated contracts in the Convention.31 Part IV of this Note 
                                                                                                             
sen court; … c) giving effect to the agreement would lead to a manifest injus-
tice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the State of the 
court seised; 
Id. art. 6 (emphasis added). 
The article 9 “escape clauses” provide that a non-chosen state may refuse to recognize a 
foreign court judgment if: 
a) the agreement was null and void under the law of the State of the chosen 
court, unless the chosen court has determined that the agreement is valid or … 
e) recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the public 
policy of the requested State, including situations where the specific proceed-
ings leading to the judgment were incompatible with fundamental principles of 
procedural fairness of that State; 
Id. art. 9 (emphasis added). 
 28. Krause, supra note 19. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See Part III.C. infra (Art. 21 of the Convention provides that a State which “has a 
strong interest I not applying this Convention to a specific matter” may “declare that is 
will not apply the Convention to that matter.”). 
 31. The reason larger companies are not as at-risk by the inclusion of non-negotiated 
contracts is because if a big company encounters a click-wrap contract for something and 
does not like the terms, the company can easily contact the seller of the click-wrap item 
and negotiate a special contract, which could include bargaining for alternative litigation 
criteria. See Jonathan A. Franklin & Roberta Morris, Int’l Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
of Judgments in the Era of Global Networks: Irrelevance of, Goals For, and Comments 
on the Current Proposals, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1213, 1285–86 (2002). On the other 
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suggests other possible solutions for at-risk businesses and organizations, 
including urging the U.S. to make a declaration32 upon ratification, sign-
ing a supplemental convention, and waiting to see the effects should the 
U.S. ratify the Convention. Part V concludes that if the U.S. decides to 
ratify the Convention as is, the best option for those at-risk by the inclu-
sion of non-negotiated contracts is to limit non-negotiated transactions 
until the Convention is modified or the drafter of the non-negotiated con 
tract modifies the forum-selection clause. 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF CONVENTION 
   The basic rules of the Convention lie within Articles 5,33 6,34 and 8.35 
                                                                                                             
hand, like consumers, Universities and libraries are not in the position to negotiate every 
click-wrap contract, nor are they able to assume the risk of having to go to a foreign fo-
rum. Id. at 1289. 
 32. Convention, supra note 3, art. 21. 
 33. Article 5 of the Convention states: 
1. The court or courts of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice 
of court agreement shall have jurisdiction to decide a dispute to which the 
agreement applies, unless the agreement is null and void under the law of that 
State. 
2. A court that has jurisdiction under paragraph 1 shall not decline to exercise 
jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute should be decided in a court of an-
other State. 
3. The preceding paragraphs shall not affect rules: a) on jurisdiction related to 
subject matter or to the value of the claim; b) on the internal allocation of juris-
diction among the courts of a Contracting State. However, where the chosen 
court has discretion as to whether to transfer a case, due consideration should 
be given to the choice of the parties. 
Convention, supra note 3, art. 5. 
 34. Article 6 of the Convention provides: 
A court of a Contracting State other than that of the chosen court shall suspend 
or dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies 
unless: 
a) the agreement is null and void under the law of the State of the chosen court; 
b) a party lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement under the law of the 
State of the court seised; 
c) giving effect to the agreement would lead to a manifest injustice or would be 
manifestly contrary to the public policy of the State of the court seised; 
d)for exceptional reasons beyond the control of the parties, the agreement can-
not reasonably be performed; or 
e) the chosen court has decided not to hear the case. 
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First, the Convention provides that the court designated in an exclusive 
choice-of-court agreement will have exclusive jurisdiction to decide the 
dispute and will not be allowed to decline jurisdiction “on the ground 
that the dispute should be decided by a court in another State.”36 Second, 
                                                                                                             
Id. art. 6. 
 35. Article 8 of the Convention provides: 
1. A judgment given by a court of a Contracting State designated in an exclu-
sive choice of court agreement shall be recognised and enforced in other Con-
tracting States in accordance with this Chapter. Recognition or enforcement 
may be refused only on the grounds specified in this Convention. 
2. Without prejudice to such review as is necessary for the application of the 
provisions of this Chapter, there shall be no review of the merits of the judg-
ment given by the court of origin. The court addressed shall be bound by the 
findings of fact on which the court of origin based its jurisdiction, unless the 
judgment was given by default. 
3. A judgment shall be recognised only if it has effect in the State of origin, and 
shall be enforced only if it is enforceable in the State of origin. 
4. Recognition or enforcement may be postponed or refused if the judgment is 
the subject of review in the State of origin or if the time limit for seeking ordi-
nary review has not expired. A refusal does not prevent a subsequent applica-
tion for recognition or enforcement of the judgment. 
5. This Article shall also apply to a judgment given by a court of a Contracting 
State pursuant to a transfer of the case from the chosen court in that Contracting 
State as permitted by Article 5, paragraph 3. However, where the chosen court 
had discretion as to whether to transfer the case to another court, recognition or 
enforcement of the judgment may be refused against a party who objected to 
the transfer in a timely manner in the State of origin. 
Id. art. 8. 
 36. Id. art. 5(1)–(2). Article 5(2) thus forbids a court from using the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens to transfer the case to a court in a foreign State. Draft Report, supra note 
3, art. 5. The doctrine of forum non conveniens, which appears mostly in common law 
systems, allows a court with proper jurisdiction to stay or dismiss a case where there is a 
more appropriate forum for the proceedings. Ronald A. Brand, Comparative Forum Non 
Conveniens on Jurisdiction and Judgments, 37 TEX. INT’L L. J. 467, 468 (2002). For ex-
ample, assume a claim is brought in New York state court for breach of contract involv-
ing products manufactured in Germany. The plaintiff is a German corporation and the 
manufacturer of the products is a United States corporation with its principle place of 
business in Delaware. The New York courts are the chosen forum in the contract, and the 
contract also provides German law as the choice of law. All witnesses, except the CEO of 
the U.S. corporation, are located in Germany. The New York court would likely conclude 
that Germany is a better forum to determine the case and would dismiss the case based on 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In contrast, under the Convention, the New York 
court must hear the case. However, the court could transfer the case to a New York fed-
eral court or to a Delaware federal court because these courts are still within the larger 
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the Convention requires that if an exclusive choice-of-court agreement 
designating a signature State exists, a court not designated in the agree-
ment must decline to exercise jurisdiction37 over any proceeding incon-
sistent with the choice-of-court agreement—even if the court otherwise 
has jurisdiction under its national laws.38 For example, if a party to an 
agreement attempts to circumvent the exclusive choice-of-court clause 
and brings a suit in a different forum than designated in the agreement, 
the court must refuse to take the case.39 However, there are exceptions to 
this rule which would allow the court to accept jurisdiction despite the 
choice-of-court agreement if: (1) the agreement is “null and void;”40 (2) a 
party “lacked capacity” to enter into the agreement;41 (3) the “agreement 
cannot be performed” by the parties for “exceptional reasons” outside 
their control;42 (4) upholding the agreement would lead to “manifest in-
justice” or would be “manifestly contrary to the public policy” of the 
State;43 or (5) the “chosen court has decided not to hear the case.”44 
                                                                                                             
chosen “State,”—the United States. Draft Report, supra note 3, art. 5, n.92. In paragraphs 
3(a) and (b) under article 5, the Convention further states that parties to the proceedings 
cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction or other internal procedural rules, such as rules 
precluding certain parties from bringing suit. Id. art. 5, para. 3(a)–(b). Thus, if the pro-
ceedings concern a matter for which a specialized court exists (such as patent or bank-
ruptcy), and the chosen court is not the proper specialized court, then the chosen court 
would not be obliged to hear the case. Id. art. 5, para. 101. The chosen court could, how-
ever, transfer the case to the state court with the proper jurisdiction—even if the proper 
court is in a state other than the one designated in the choice-of-court agreement. Id. art. 
5, paras. 101, 107. 
 37. Convention, supra note 3, art. 6. The provisions of this section are most applica-
ble when a party to a choice of court agreement tries to bring suit in a court that is not the 
chosen court within the agreement. 
 38. Draft Report, supra note 3, art. 6, paras. 107, 119. 
 39. See id. 
 40. Convention, supra note 3, art. 6(a). This provision requires the agreement be “null 
and void” under the laws of the chosen State, thus application of the law of the chosen 
court is necessary. Draft Report, supra note 3, art. 7, para. 124. 
 41. Convention, supra note 3, art. 6(b). Under the “capacity” provision, the non-
chosen court will apply its own choice-of-law rules to determine whether there was lack 
of capacity by one of the parties. Draft Report, supra note 3, art. 7, para. 125. 
 42. Convention, supra note 3, art. 6(d). This is intended to apply to cases when it 
would not be possible to bring proceedings before the chosen court, such as when there is 
a war in the State of the chosen court or the chosen court no longer exists. Draft Report, 
supra note 3, art. 7, para. 129. 
 43. Convention, supra note 3, art. 6(c). For a discussion on the public policy excep-
tion, see infra Part II. 
 44. Convention, supra note 3, art. 6(e). This could be covered under article 6(d), but 
the drafters thought it was worthy of its own treatment. Draft Report, supra note 3, para. 
130. 
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Finally, when requested, a State must recognize and enforce a judg-
ment given by a signature State designated in an exclusive choice-of-
court agreement.45 The Convention provides exceptions to this require-
ment as well.46 Recognition or enforcement may be refused by a State on 
the grounds that: (1) the contract is invalid;47 (2) a party lacked capacity 
to enter into the agreement;48 (3) improper notice was given to the defen-
dant;49 (4) the judgment was obtained by procedural fraud;50 (5) the 
                                                                                                             
 45. See art. 8 supra note 35. 
 46. Convention, supra note 3, art. 9. 
 47. See Convention, supra note 3, art. 9(a). Article 9(a) provides that “recognition or 
enforcement may be refused if a) the agreement was null and void under the law of the 
State of the chosen court, unless the chosen court has determined that the agreement is 
valid.” Id. This clause is analogous to the exception in article 6(a). 
 48. See Convention, supra note 3, art. 9(b). This clause reads: “a party lacked the 
capacity to conclude the agreement under the law of the requested State.” Id. This clause 
is analogous to the one in article 6(b). 
 49. See Convention, supra note 3, art. 9(c). This clause provides that recognition or 
enforcement may be refused if: 
c) the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document, 
including the essential elements of the claim, 
i) was not notified to the defendant in sufficient time and in such a 
way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant 
entered an appearance and presented his case without contesting noti-
fication in the court of origin, provided that the law of the State of 
origin permitted notification to be contested; or 
ii) was notified to the defendant in the requested State in a manner 
that is incompatible with fundamental principles of the requested 
State concerning service of documents. 
Id. 
This exception applies if the defendant was not given enough time after notification to 
prepare his defense. Id. However, this exception is waived if the defendant made an ap-
pearance in the proceedings without contesting the notification or requesting an adjourn-
ment in order to properly prepare. See id. This prevents the defendant from raising insuf-
ficient notification as a ground for non-enforcement when it could have been raised in the 
initial proceedings. Draft Report, supra note 3, art. 9, para. 140. The exception however, 
will not be waived if the court giving the judgment does not allow notification to be con-
tested. Convention, supra note 3, art. 9(c)(i). Provision 9(c)(ii) provides that recognition 
and enforcement can be refused if the manner of notification was “incompatible with 
fundamental principles” relating to service of process in the requested State. Id. art. 
9(c)(ii). This provision only applies if recognition or enforcement is requested of the 
State in which service took place. Draft Report, supra note 3, art. 9, para. 140. 
 50. Convention, supra note 3, art. 9(d). This clause reads: “the judgment was obtained 
by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure.” Id. Fraud in this provision means 
“deliberate dishonesty or deliberate wrongdoing.” Draft Report, supra note 3, art. 9, para. 
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judgment violates public policy of the state;51 (6) the judgment is incon-
sistent with a prior judgment in the State involving the same parties;52 or 
(7) the judgment is inconsistent with a prior judgment given in another 
State.53 
III. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION 
Articles 6(c) and 9(e) of the Convention contain the public policy “es-
cape clauses.” As mentioned above, although the court not chosen in the 
choice-of-court clause is required to suspend or dismiss the action, 6(c) 
allows the court to take jurisdiction of the case if giving effect to the 
agreement would be “manifestly contrary to the public policy of the State 
                                                                                                             
142. For example, this provision would apply if the plaintiff forged the defendant’s signa-
ture on a false document. Id. 
 51. Convention, supra note 3, art. 9(e). This provision reads: “recognition or en-
forcement would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the requested 
State, including situations where the specific proceedings leading to the judgment were 
incompatible with fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that State.” Id. The 
second half of this provision is meant to apply to States where due process of law, natural 
justice of the right to fair trial is constitutionally mandated. Draft Report, supra note 3, 
art. 9, para. 143. See also Part III infra. 
 52. Convention, supra note 3, art. 9(f). Article 9(f) reads: “the judgment is inconsis-
tent with a judgment given in the requested State in a dispute between the same parties.” 
Id. This exception will typically arise in instances where the judgment that conflicts with 
the chosen court’s final judgment was given because the requested court thought that one 
of the article 6 exceptions applied. Draft Report, supra note 3, art. 9, para. 148. If the 
exception did apply, then the requested court can give preference to its own ruling. Id. If 
no exception applies, the requested court would have violated the Convention by hearing 
the proceeding and should give the chosen court’s judgment preference. Id. 
 53. Convention, supra note 3, art. 9(g). This provision states: “the judgment is incon-
sistent with an earlier judgment given in another State between the same parties on the 
same cause of action, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary 
for its recognition in the requested State.” Id. This applies when both judgments were 
given by foreign courts. Draft Report, supra note 3, art. 9, para. 149. In this situation, the 
judgment given by the court designated in the choice-of-court agreement can be refused 
recognition and enforcement if the following requirements are met: (1) the judgment 
under the chosen court was given after the conflicting judgment; (2) both judgments in-
volve the same parties; (3) the cause of action of the judgments is the same; and (4) the 
conflicting judgment must fulfill the requirements necessary for recognition in the re-
quested state. Id. Note however, that in the Draft Report it was mentioned that provision 
(g) should be modified because it currently provides an incentive for states not to become 
parties to the Convention because it is not required that the conflicting judgment not be in 
contravention of the Convention. Id. Since non-Contracting States are not parties to the 
Convention their judgments will never be in contravention of the Convention. Id. 
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of the court seized.”54 Similarly, Article 9(e) allows a court to refuse to 
recognize or enforce a foreign court judgment if “recognition or en-
forcement would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of 
the requested State.”55 Not surprisingly, what constitutes a violation of 
public policy is not defined in the Convention. However, the use of the 
public policy exception to deny recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments and forum-selection clauses is not new to the Convention; the 
exception has been widely recognized in U.S. law56 and in other statutes 
and conventions as well.57 
In practice however, there are few cases in the U.S. that have denied 
recognition and enforcement on public policy reasons alone, despite the 
fact that every state has the right to refuse enforcement of a foreign 
judgment.58 Nevertheless, it is valuable to examine U.S. public policy 
jurisprudence to understand the application of the exception to foreign 
judgments and assess the viability of this exception as a means to protect 
those at-risk by the inclusion of non-negotiated contracts within the Con-
                                                                                                             
 54. Convention, supra note 3, art. 6(c). This clause also allows the court seized to 
accept jurisdiction if “giving effect to the agreement would lead to “manifest injustice.” 
Id. 
 55. Id. art. 9(e). This article continues with “including situations where the specific 
proceedings leading to judgment were incompatible with fundamental principles of pro-
cedural fairness of the State.” Id. 
 56. See infra, Part III.A. and B. 
 57. In the U.S., the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Arbitral Awards does not require enforcement of an otherwise unenforceable arbitral 
award when such enforcement would be “contrary to the public policy” of the enforcing 
country. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards, art. 5(2)(b), Dec. 29, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New 
York Convention]. As the name suggests, the New York Convention sets out rules for 
recognition and enforcement for foreign arbitral awards. Similarly, a number of states 
have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (“UFMJRA”) 
which provides that recognition is not necessary if the action underlying the judgment is 
“repugnant to the public policy of [the] state.” Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Rec-
ognition Act of 1962, § 4(b)(3), 13 U.L.A 80 (Supp. 1998). The Brussels Convention, 
adopted in 1968, regulates the standards of jurisdiction and enforcement between Mem-
ber States of the European Union. Its public policy exception states that a judgment will 
not be recognized “if such recognition is contrary to public policy in the State in which 
recognition is sought. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, tit. III, § 1, art. 27(1) Sept. 27, 1968, as amended, 1998 
O.J. (C 27) 1, 10 [hereinafter Brussels Convention]. 
 58. Andreas F. Lowenfeld and Linda J. Silberman, United States of America, in 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE 123, 123, 129 (Charles Platto & 
William G. Hornton eds., 2nd ed. 1993). Because there is no U.S. federal law governing 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign court judgments, state law applies, even in 
federal courts. Id. at 123. 
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vention. Similarly, despite the fact that there is currently no U.S. case 
law involving click-wrap agreements containing foreign forum-selection 
clauses which have resulted in contested foreign judgments, examining 
U.S. jurisprudence involving click-wrap agreements and forum-selection 
clauses in a domestic setting is also relevant. This will aid in assessing 
whether U.S. courts might perceive these types of agreements as viola-
tions of public policy. 
A. Public Policy Exception Jurisprudence 
1. Non-Recognition of the Public Policy Exception 
The leading case defining the public policy exception is Parsons & 
Whittemore Overseas Co. Inc. v. Société Génerale de l’Industrie du 
Papier (RAKTA).59 Although this case was decided in the context of en-
forcement of a foreign arbitral award, the holding still applies to en-
forcement of foreign judgments in general.60 In Parsons, the Egyptian 
corporation Société Génerale de l’Industrie du Papier (“RAKTA”) con-
tracted with the American corporation Parsons & Whittemore Overseas 
Co. Inc. (“Overseas”) to construct and manage a paperboard mill in 
Egypt.61 The agreement contained an arbitration clause and a force ma-
jeure clause.62 Near the end of the construction phase, Egypt severed ties 
with the United States and “ordered all Americans expelled from Egypt” 
except those approved for special visas.63 Overseas subsequently aban-
doned the project and “notified RAKTA that it regarded this postpone-
ment as excused by the force majeure clause.”64 RAKTA disagreed that 
                                                                                                             
 59. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. Inc. v. Société Génerale de l’Industrie du 
Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 58, 
at 129. 
 60. See Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 58, at 129. Although Lowenfeld and 
Silberman do not say why enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is relevant to the en-
forcement of foreign judgments in general, the author of this Note presumes it is because 
courts tend to use the same public policy analysis regardless of whether it is a foreign 
arbitration judgment or a foreign court judgment. Article 5(2)(b) of the New York Con-
vention allows the court in which enforcement of the foreign arbitral award is sought to 
refuse enforcement if “enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy 
of [the forum] country.” New York Convention, supra note 57, art. 5(2)(b). For further 
discussion on the New York Convention see note 57 supra. 
 61. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 972. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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the delay fell under the force majeure clause, and brought an arbitration 
proceeding for damages for breach of contract.65 
The arbitration panel awarded damages to RAKTA finding that the 
force majeure clause only covered part of the delay because Overseas 
had not made an effort to complete the contract.66 One of Overseas’ de-
fenses during the U.S. enforcement proceedings was the public policy 
exception to the New York Convention.67 Overseas argued that enforcing 
the arbitration award on the ground that it could complete the contract, 
despite the severance of American and Egyptian ties and the U.S. with-
drawal of funding for international development, would contravene U.S. 
public policy.68 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed 
with Overseas’ argument equating “national” policy with United States 
“public” policy.69 The court concluded that to do so “would mean con-
verting a defense intended to be of narrow scope into a major loophole” 
to the New York Convention.70 The court subsequently upheld the arbi-
tration award and reasoned that the public policy exception only applies 
“where enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic notions 
of morality and justice.”71 
Even when the substantive laws of the State handing down the judg-
ment are different from those in the U.S., the public policy exception has 
been an inadequate reason to overturn a foreign judgment.72 In Sompor-
tex, the District Court for the Third Circuit upheld a decision enforcing a 
British court default judgment against an American corporation.73 There, 
the plaintiff, a British corporation, had entered into a contract whereby 
the American defendant corporation would distribute the defendant’s 
gum in Great Britain.74 When the transaction failed, the plaintiff filed 
suit in a British court for breach of contract.75 The British court entered a 
default judgment against the defendant,76 and the plaintiff subsequently 
                                                                                                             
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 972; See also note 39 supra. 
 68. Id. at 974. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22242, at *16 (2005). 
 73. Somportex, 453 F.2d at 444. 
 74. Id. at 436 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 439. 
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sought enforcement of the judgment in a U.S. court.77 The defendant 
raised the public policy defense because the British court awarded attor-
ney’s fees, which would not have been “recoverable under Pennsylvania 
law.”78 The defendant argued that enforcement of the attorney’s fees was 
contrary to Pennsylvania public policy.79 
Nevertheless, the court dismissed the defendant’s argument and agreed 
with the district court’s decision that the “variance with Pennsylvania 
law is not such that the enforcement ‘tends clearly to injure the public 
health, the public morals, the public confidence in the purity of the ad-
ministration of the law, or to undermine that sense of security for indi-
vidual rights, whether of personal liberty or of private property, which 
any citizen ought to feel, is against public policy.’”80 The court con-
cluded that the difference between British and Pennsylvania law was not 
enough to refuse enforcement on the basis of public policy.81 
Similarly, courts have even found that a difference in substantive fed-
eral laws is insufficient justification for applying the public policy excep-
tion. In Viewfinder, the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York declined to apply the public policy exception despite inconsisten-
cies between French and U.S. intellectual property laws.82 The French 
plaintiff argued in its initial action that the American defendant, View-
finder, violated the plaintiff’s intellectual property rights and engaged in 
unfair competition by posting on its website photographs of models 
wearing the plaintiff’s clothing.83 The defendant raised the public policy 
defense, arguing that his actions did not “violate American trademark 
principles;” the website postings constituted fair use; and the plaintiffs 
“could not copyright their dress designs” under U.S. copyright law. 84 
                                                                                                             
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 443. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (quoting the District Court quoting Goodyear v. Brown, 26 A. 665, 668 (P.A. 
1893)). 
 81. Id. at 444. 
 82. Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22242, at *16. 
However, the court did apply the public policy exception on other grounds, finding that 
the defendant’s conduct was protected under the First Amendment, and thus, enforcing 
the agreement would violate U.S. public policy. Id. at *19. 
 83. Id. at *1. Even though the French court entered a default judgment against View-
finder and therefore did not directly apply French intellectual property laws, the District 
Court addressed the defendant’s intellectual property law public policy argument any-
ways. Id. at *15−17. 
 84. Id. at *14–15. The fair use doctrine is an affirmative defense to copyright in-
fringement. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (2005). The fair use doctrine allows the public to copy 
parts of a copyrighted work for purposes of criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship or research. Id. Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act states: 
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The court disagreed with the defendant’s argument and stated that the 
differences in French and American intellectual property law “do not 
come close” to meeting the public policy standard.85 
Copyright and trademark law are not matters of strong moral principle. 
Intellectual property regimes are economic legislation based on policy 
decisions that assign rights based on assessments of what legal rules 
will produce the greatest economic good for society as a whole. … If 
the United States has not seen fit to permit fashion designs to be copy-
righted, that does not mean that a foreign judgment based on a contrary 
policy decision is somehow repugnant to the public policies underlying 
the Copyright Act and trademark law.86 
Courts have also found that differences in procedural laws between the 
U.S. and a foreign State are insufficient reason to withhold enforcement 
under the public policy exception. In Tahan v. Hodgson, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia refused to find a violation of public 
policy solely because of a difference in procedure.87 The defendant in 
this case argued that upholding an Israeli default judgment was against 
public policy because the notice he received was different than that re-
                                                                                                             
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a co-
pyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom 
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determin-
ing whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the fac-
tors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of 
fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above 
factors. 
Id. 
 85. Viewfinder, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22242, at *16. 
 86. Id. (citations omitted). 
 87. 662 F.2d 862, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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quired under U.S. law.88 The court felt that the differences in procedure 
did not violate public policy because the Israeli notice procedures were 
not “repugnant to notions of what is decent and just.”89 
2. Recognition of the Public Policy Exception 
In most cases in which courts find public policy violations, there is at 
stake some interest of the forum greater than protecting the litigant,90 
such as a violation of the U.S. Constitution or the desire to prevent indi-
viduals from circumventing federal or state laws.91 In Matusevitch v. 
Telnikoff,92 the District Court for the D.C. Circuit refused to enforce a 
British court libel judgment on grounds that it violated U.S. and Virginia 
public policy.93 A British public figure obtained a libel judgment against 
an American writer.94 Subsequently, the writer challenged the action in 
the district court seeking summary judgment on the grounds that the for-
eign judgment was unenforceable.95 The court distinguished this case 
from other cases that had rejected the public policy defense because 
those cases “concern[ed] minor differences in statutory law and in rules 
of civil procedure or corporate or commercial law.”96 The court de-
scribed the United Kingdom libel standards, which place the burden of 
proving the truth of the statements on the defendant, as contrary to the 
U.S. libel standards, which require the plaintiff to prove that the state-
ments were false and that the defendant had the necessary intent to com-
mit libel.97 Based on the evidence, the court concluded that because the 
                                                                                                             
 88. Id. The defendant was served in Jerusalem by the plaintiff’s attorney, but the de-
fendant refused to acknowledge the service of process because the papers were written in 
Hebrew. Id. Under Rule 52(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “second” 
notice must be given at least three days prior to hearing and application for entry of a 
default judgment in some circumstances. Id. at 866. 
 89. Id. The court further pointed out that it “would be unrealistic for the United States 
to require all foreign judicial systems to adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 
Id. 
 90. Jonathan A. Pittman, Note, The Public Policy Exception to the Recognition of 
Foreign Judgments, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 969, 991 (1989) (citing von Mehren & 
Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgments in the United 
States, 6 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS, 37, 63 (1974)). 
 91. See Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. 1995); Laker Airways v. Sa-
bena, Belgian World Airlines 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff’g Laker Airways Ltd. v. 
Pan American World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124 (D.D.C 1983) 
 92. Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 1. 
 93. Id. at 4. 
 94. Id. at 3. 
 95. Id. at 2. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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defendant’s statements were not made with actual malice, enforcement of 
the British judgment would be “repugnant” to both state and U.S. public 
policy.98 
In Laker Airways, the plaintiff, British airline Laker Airways, filed an 
anti-trust action in the United States against a group of foreign and do-
mestic airlines, claiming that the defendants’ price fixing forced them out 
of business.99 Several months later, some of the defendants filed their 
own suit in the High Court of Justice in the United Kingdom seeking an 
injunction forbidding the plaintiff from prosecuting them.100 The British 
court ultimately issued the injunction, ordering the plaintiff to dismiss its 
action against the British airlines.101 In the meantime, Laker Airways 
sought an anti-suit injunction from the United States Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia to prevent the remaining defendant airlines from re-
questing an injunction from the British courts as well.102 The court 
granted the anti-suit injunction and held that anti-suit injunctions were 
justified to prevent litigants’ evasion of a forum’s public policies.103 
Although the case did not involve enforcement of a foreign judgment, 
the court in Laker Airways analogized the issuance of an anti-suit injunc-
tion to prevent a foreign court judgment with that of non-recognition of a 
foreign judgment.104 The court concluded that in both instances, states 
are “not required to give effect to foreign judicial proceedings” based on 
“policies which do violence to its own fundamental interest.”105 Here, the 
court found that the anti-trust laws were of “admitted economic impor-
tance to the United States,” and thus, public policy mandated that the 
anti-suit injunction be issued to prevent the defendants from “evad[ing] 
culpability under [the] statutes.”106 
In Ackermann v. Levine, the plaintiff, a member of a German law firm, 
sought recognition and enforcement of a German default judgment to 
recover legal fees against the defendant, an American citizen.107  The 
defendant had hired the plaintiff to help him negotiate a New Jersey real 
estate investment deal with some German banks.108 The defendant had 
specifically authorized the attorney to represent him in negotiations, but 
                                                                                                             
 98. Id. at 6. 
 99. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 915, 917. 
 100. Id. at 915. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 931. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 932. 
 107. 788 F.2d 830, 837 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 108. Id. at 835–36. 
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no fees were ever discussed.109 The plaintiff eventually sent the defen-
dant a bill for his services which were computed in accordance with a 
German legal fee statute.110 Three months later, the plaintiff won a de-
fault judgment in a West German court against the defendant.111 The Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York found the German 
judgment to be unenforceable because it was up to the attorney, not the 
client, to ensure that the client understood the compensation agreement, 
and because the parties had never discussed the fees, the judgment vio-
lated U.S. public policy.112 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district 
court’s decision in part, holding that the “narrow public policy exception 
to enforcement [was] not met” just because the defendant was not in-
formed of the German legal fee statute.113 Furthermore, the court noted 
that the exception would not be met even if the attorney’s fees were more 
than American attorneys might have charged.114 However, the court did 
find a public policy violation on a narrower basis. 
The court found that in order to recover attorney’s fees, New York 
public policy requires there be evidence of client authorization for the 
alleged work performed by the attorney and evidence the attorney actu-
ally performed the work for which he charged.115 The court held that the 
part of the German judgment that included fees for the “study of project 
files” and “discussion with client and his counsel” were unenforceable 
because there was no evidence of authorization for the work or proof of 
actual work product.116 The court felt that recognizing this portion of the 
judgment could cause “American courts [to] become the means of en-
forcing unconscionable attorney fee awards” which could lead to the en-
dangerment of “‘public confidence’ in the administration of the law.”117 
Furthermore, the court noted, recognizing the foreign judgment would 
“impose upon American citizens doing business abroad an undue risk in 
dealing with foreign counsel,” which could undermine transnational legal 
relations.118 Thus, in a sense, both New York and Germany had a sub-
stantial interest in not enforcing unconscionable attorney’s fees.119 
                                                                                                             
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 836–37. 
 111. Id. 837. 
 112. Id. at 841. 
 113. Id. at 842. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 842–43. 
 116. Id. at 844–45. 
 117. Id. at 844. 
 118. Id. at 844. 
 119. See Pittman, supra note 89, at 991. 
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In sum, the public policy exception has been construed very narrowly 
throughout U.S. jurisprudence regardless of whether the differences in 
the U.S. federal or state laws are substantive or procedural in nature and 
whether the outcome would have been different in U.S. courts. In the 
rare instances when courts have refused recognition or enforcement of a 
foreign judgment because of public policy, it has been to protect a higher 
federal or state interest, rather than out of fairness to the litigant. 
B. Click-wraps, Shrink-wraps, Forum-Selection, and Public Policy 
In general, U.S. courts have enforced forum-selection clauses120 within 
click-wrap and shrink-wrap agreements.121 Although there are no Su-
preme Court cases enforcing click-wrap agreements, lower courts have 
often justified upholding these agreements based on precedent set by the 
Supreme Court decision in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute122 and the 
                                                                                                             
 120. The seminal case for U.S. forum-selection clause enforcement is Bremen v. Za-
pata. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). In Bremen, an American company contracted with a German 
corporation to tow a drilling rig from the U.S. to the Adriatic Sea. Id. at 1. The contract, 
drafted by the German company, provided that “any dispute arising must be treated be-
fore the London Court of Justice.” Id. En route to the Adriatic Sea, the rig was severely 
damaged during a storm in the Gulf of Mexico. Id. The American company sued the 
German company in a U.S. court for damages. Id. The United States Supreme Court an-
nounced a strong policy in favor of enforcing forum-selection clauses in “freely negoti-
ated, private international agreements, unaffected by fraud, undue influence or over-
whelming bargaining power.” Id. at 12. The Court stated: 
In such circumstances, it should be incumbent upon the party seeking to escape 
his contract to show that trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely diffi-
cult and inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes be deprived of his 
day in court. Absent that, there is no basis for concluding that it would be un-
fair, unjust, or unreasonable to hold that party to his bargain. 
Id. at 18. 
 121. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing a software 
shrink-wrap agreement); Decker v. Circus Circus Hotel 49 F. Supp. 2d 743 (D.N.J. 1999) 
(finding a click-wrap forum-selection clause enforceable); Forrest v. Verizon Communi-
cations, Inc. 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. 2002) (enforcing a click-wrap agreement which re-
quired that all disputes be brought in Virginia); Hughes v. McMenamon 204 F. Supp. 2d 
178 (D. Mass. 2002) (enforcing a click-wrap forum-selection clause designating Virginia 
as the exclusive choice-of-court); But see America Online v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding forum-selection clause was not enforceable 
because it violates California public policy). For an overview of click-wrap agreement 
jurisprudence see William J. Condon Jr., Comment, Electronic Assent to Online Con-
tracts: Do Courts Consistently Enforce Clickwrap Agreements?, 18 REGENT U. L. REV. 
433 (2004). 
 122. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
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Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.123 In 
Shute, the Court upheld a non-negotiated contract because it was reason-
able that the terms were non-negotiable.124 In ProCD, the court estab-
lished that shrink-wrap agreements were enforceable.125 Courts have 
since reasoned that if shrink-wrap contracts are enforceable because an 
individual gives their consent to the terms by not returning the product, 
then it follows that an agreement where an individual assents in a more 
express way by clicking “I Agree” should also be enforceable.126 Courts 
have generally held that as long as the vendor makes the terms available 
for the individual’s acceptance, and does not try to hide them, the agree-
ment will be enforceable.127 Courts have further justified their reasoning 
on federal and state public policy grounds concluding that enforcement 
of click-wrap agreements supports the freedom of contract, encourages 
nationwide commerce,128 “protects small businesses, and promotes the 
Internet as a valuable vehicle for conducting business.”129 
                                                                                                             
 123. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 124. See Condon, supra note 121, at 440. In Shute the court enforced a contract of 
adhesion between Carnival Cruise lines and the plaintiff which required that all litigation 
relating to the cruise be brought in the state of Florida. 499 U.S. at 587–88, 595. The 
court reasoned that although the contract was one of adhesion, it was a routine transac-
tion. Id. at 593. And because it did not eliminate the plaintiff’s “right to ‘a trial by a court 
of competent jurisdiction’” it was enforceable. Id. at 596 (quoting 46 U.S.C. app. § 
183(c) (2001)). 
 125. See Condon, supra note 121, at 440. In ProCD, the court enforced the terms of a 
shrink-wrap agreement, even though the defendant was not aware of the terms of the 
agreement until after the purchase of the software. 86 F.3d at 1450. The court reasoned 
that the shrink-wrap agreement was analogous to other “pay now, terms later” transac-
tions, such as insurance, airline tickets and concert tickets, which were enforceable under 
the UCC. Id. at 1451–52. Therefore, because the defendant was given the opportunity to 
review the terms and return the software if he did not accept them, the shrink-wrap 
agreement was enforceable. Id. 
 126. See i.LAN Systems, Inc. v. NetScout Service Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 
338 (D. Mass. 2002) (relying on ProCD and finding that click-wrap agreements are en-
forceable); Decker, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 748 (relying on Shute and holding that a non-
negotiated but accepted contract was enforceable). 
 127. See Shute, 499 U.S. 585; Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 530, 
532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (comparing terms placed in small print on a passen-
ger ticket with terms placed in a scrollable window of a computer and finding that regard-
less of the medium, both provide sufficient notice of contract terms). See also Condon, 
supra note 121, at 446. 
 128. See Forrest v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1013 n.13 (D.C. 
2002) (citing Paul Business Systems, Inc. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc. 397 S.E.2d 804, 807 (Va. 
1990)). The Forrest court stated that “a contract is no less a contract simply because it is 
entered into via a computer.” Id. at 1101. 
 129. Condon, supra note 121, at 446 (citing Stomp, Inc. v. NeatO L.L.C., 61 F. Supp 
2d 1074, 1080–81 (C.D. Cal. 1999)). 
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Although there are strong policy reasons supporting click-wraps, at 
least one court has found that a click-wrap agreement can violate public 
policy. In America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, a California Appeals 
court found a click-wrap agreement unenforceable because it violated 
California public policy of protecting consumers from deceptive business 
practices.130 The case involved an AOL click-wrap agreement that in-
cluded a forum-selection and choice-of-law clause designating Virginia 
as the exclusive choice of forum and law.131 The court said that to be va-
lid, a forum-selection clause, among other things, must not “substantially 
diminish the rights of California consumers in a way that violates Cali-
fornia public policy.”132 The court concluded that because Virginia lim-
ited the remedies available to California consumers by not allowing non-
statutory class-action suits, it thereby violated California public policy.133 
C. Lessons Learned 
In looking at the public policy jurisprudence in context with the click-
wrap cases above, it is hard to make a viable argument that the public 
policy “escape clauses” in the Convention are anything more than a po-
litical tool to make States feel comfortable with adopting the Conven-
tion.134 First, the click-wrap cases and the precedent they rely on demon-
strate that there is a strong U.S. policy favoring enforcement of contracts 
entered into freely, regardless of whether or not they were negotiated.135 
The U.S. courts’ desire to allow party autonomy in contracts and to en-
courage online transactions seems to have outweighed the basic contract 
principle of having an “arms length transaction.”136 Thus, a defendant 
urging a U.S. court to not recognize a foreign judgment on the basis that 
it was non-negotiated is not likely to be successful unless there is a larger 
state or federal public policy violation like in America Online.137 
                                                                                                             
 130. 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 702, 710 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
 131. Id. at 701–02. 
 132. Id. at 707–08. The court stated that the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act 
was designed “to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and 
to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.” Id. at 710. 
 133. Id. at 702. But cf. Forrest, 805 A.2d at 1012 (citing cases which have upheld fo-
rum-selection clauses because other remedies other than class action were still available 
to the individual). 
 134. See Karen Minehan, Note, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments: Necessary or Nemesis?, 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 795, 817–
18 (1996), for a discussion of the public policy exception as a necessary political tool for 
the Convention “because it counters the fears of recalcitrant countries.” 
 135. See supra note 121. 
 136. See supra note 128–29. 
 137. See America Online, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699. 
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Second, the public policy cases prove that the public policy bar is ex-
tremely high. The party resisting enforcement must prove more than a 
mere difference in law or outcome between the foreign State and the 
U.S.138 The violation must be extreme.139 But what exactly is enough, 
besides a direct constitutional violation, to violate a forum’s “most basic 
notions of morality and justice” is unclear.140 On one hand, the Acker-
mann case could be read as expanding the public policy exception be-
cause finding enforcement of unconscionable attorney’s fees as against 
public policy does not seem to be on the same plane as a constitutional 
violation.141 On the other hand, the Viewfinder case, although only a sin-
gle federal court case, seems to narrow the public policy exception.142 If 
violation of the principles of U.S. copyright law is not a violation of pub-
lic policy, then it seems that critics of the inclusion of non-negotiated 
contracts are rightly concerned.143 Even though Viewfinder did not in-
volve a contract between two parties, it seems that under that case, if a 
U.S. court is willing to enforce a judgment contrary to U.S. copyright 
law that was not based on a contract,144 then it would follow that they 
would be just as likely to enforce a clause in a click-wrap agreement that 
contracts away U.S. copyright rights.145 If this is the case, then the fears 
expressed by libraries may be realistic.146 
Third, forum shopping for the most favorable laws does not seem to 
violate public policy under the current line of cases. Although the Amer-
ica Online case recognized the public policy exception when there was 
circumvention of California’s public policy,147 this case is probably lim-
ited in its application to the Convention because it involved a consumer 
and consumer protection laws.148 The Convention does not cover con-
                                                                                                             
 138. See Somportex, 453 F.2d at 443 (finding that a difference in laws governing attor-
ney fee awards does not violate public policy.); See generally Part III.A. supra. 
 139. See Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 4 (finding that the difference between U.K. and 
U.S. libel laws was substantial enough to recognize the public policy exception); See 
generally supra Part III.A.2. 
 140. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 974. 
 141. See Ackermann, 788 F. 2d at 844. 
 142. See Viewfinder, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22242, at *16. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. This is the same type of reasoning that courts used to determine that if shrink-
wrap agreements were enforceable, then a click-wrap agreement to which a party ex-
pressly assents in a direct way should also be enforceable. See supra note 126. 
 146. See supra notes 17 and 18. 
 147. See America Online, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 702. 
 148. It is also important to note that it seems that California is the only U.S. state that 
rejects click-wrap agreements. See supra note 121. 
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sumer contracts.149 Moreover, while the Laker Airways case suggested 
that a court would be justified in refusing to enforce a foreign judgment 
if the plaintiff had somehow circumvented the enforcing court’s public 
policy interests,150 the U.S. tends to enforce both forum-selection clauses 
and click-wrap agreements.151 Thus, a defendant’s argument that the fo-
rum shopping was a form of circumvention of the forum’s public policies 
would be less effective because the plaintiff could just counter that the 
forum was agreed to in the contract. 
Finally, the public policy and click-wrap cases show that because most 
U.S. jurisdictions already have a public policy exception available when 
considering these types of cases, it is unlikely that formalizing it in the 
Convention will change their existing practices. Thus, as mentioned be-
fore, if the Convention is adopted, those at-risk by the inclusion of non-
negotiated contracts will have to look elsewhere for protection. 
III. OTHER OPTIONS152 
A. Declaration 
One option for critics of the inclusion of non-negotiated contracts is to 
urge the U.S. to make a declaration153 that it will not apply the Conven-
                                                                                                             
 149. See Convention, supra note 3, art. 2(1). 
 150. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 931–32. 
 151. See supra note 120–21. 
 152. Direct revisions to the Convention are not suggested as options here since the 
approved Convention was already signed by the Member States and all previously rec-
ommended revisions to the non-negotiated contract aspect of the Convention have been 
rejected. Besides removing non-negotiated contracts from the scope of the Convention, 
some of the previously suggested revisions have included the addition of a clause protect-
ing certain institutions: “Agreements conferring jurisdiction and similar clauses in non-
negotiated contracts with non-profit, non-commercial organizations, including non-profit 
libraries, archives, and educational institutions, shall be without effect.” See Robert Oak-
ley Letter, supra note 17. Adding the following “fairness” clause was another recommen-
dation: “The agreement on choice of court shall be void or voidable if it has been ob-
tained by an abuse of economic power or other unfair means.” James Love, What You 
Should Know About the Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law’s Proposed Convention 
on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, CPTech.org, 
http://www.cptech.org/ecom/jurisdiction/whatyoushould know.html. One reason for not 
adding a fairness clause was that it would reduce the certainty of the Convention because 
it would be difficult to determine what various jurisdictions will deem as “fair” or a 
“weaker business.” Hague Conference on Private Int’l L., Choice of Court Agreements in 
International Litigation: Their Use and Legal Problems to Which They Give Rise in the 
Context of the Interim Text, para. 16, Prel. Doc. No. 18, Feb. 2002, 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gen_pd18e.pdf. 
 153. For example, “Canada is on record as saying that it will not apply the Convention 
to asbestos cases.” Delegates Sign Convention, supra note 12, at 18. 
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tion to non-negotiated contracts. Article 21 of the Convention allows a 
signature State to declare that it will not apply the Convention to a spe-
cific matter, if it has a strong interest in that matter.154 The matter to 
which the declaration pertains must be “clearly and precisely defined” 
and must be “no broader than necessary.”155 Furthermore, the Conven-
tion will not apply to the subject matter for which the declaration is made 
within the declaring State, nor will it apply to that subject matter within 
the other signature States where an exclusive choice-of-court agreement 
has designated the declaring State as the exclusive forum.156 Unfortu-
nately, it is unlikely that the U.S. will actually make such a declaration 
since it took over ten years to reach an agreement on a final Convention 
and because the U.S. negotiators seem to support the inclusion of non-
negotiated contracts.157 The negotiators hope that the Convention will 
become the litigation counterpart to the New York Convention158 and 
will provide businesses in international transactions a choice between 
selecting arbitration or litigation as the method to resolve disputes.159 
Furthermore, the purpose of the Convention will be defeated if many 
States make declarations on many matters.160 
                                                                                                             
 154. Convention, supra note 3, art. 21. Article 21, declarations with respect to specific 
matters, states in full: 
1. Where a State has a strong interest in not applying this Convention to a spe-
cific matter, that State may declare that it will not apply the Convention to that 
matter. The State making such a declaration shall ensure that the declaration is 
no broader than necessary and that the specific matter excluded is clearly and 
precisely defined. 
2. With regard to that matter, the Convention shall not apply – a) in the Con-
tracting State that made the declaration; b) in other Contracting States, where 
an exclusive choice of court agreement designates the courts, or one or more 
specific courts, of the State that made the declaration. 
Id. 
 155. Id. art. 21(1). 
 156. Id. art. 21(2). 
 157. See supra note 26. 
 158. See supra note 57. 
 159. See Ronald A. Brand, The New Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agree-
ments, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS, July 2005, available at 
http://www.asil.org/insights/email/insights0507262.html. 
 160. See Delegates Sign Report, supra note 12, at 18. The objective of the Convention 
is to create clarity and certainty in transactions, if there are many exceptions then busi-
nesses will be left with uncertainty as to the effectiveness of the Convention. 
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B. Supplemental Convention 
Another option is for the U.S. is to try to make a declaration and then 
enter into a separate bilateral agreement regarding non-negotiated con-
tracts with other Member States that are a party to the Convention. This 
would allow the U.S. to choose which States’ non-negotiated contract 
judgments to recognize.161 However, it will be time consuming to negoti-
ate an agreement with individual States and would require the U.S. to 
pass judgment on another country’s court system.162 In the end, this 
could lead to a negative effect on U.S. relations. 
C. Wait and See 
Another option for critics is to continue to lobby Congress and then 
just “wait-and-see” whether other States decide to adopt the Convention. 
Without a significant number of signature States, the Convention will be 
of little effect and there may not be any reason for concern.163 Further-
more, if the Convention is adopted and the critics’ concerns turn out to 
be correct, they can still petition the U.S to make a declaration as men-
tioned above or petition the Secretary General of the HCPIL to amend 
the Convention.164 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Hague Convention on Choice of Courts provides a way to bring 
certainty and clarity in on-line and off-line international business-to-
business transactions. However, this benefit may bring risks to smaller 
businesses and other organizations such as libraries and non-profits that 
purchase information goods and services on-line. These groups may be 
forced to defend a suit in a foreign country which could lead to an ad-
verse foreign judgment which a U.S. court may then be obligated to en-
                                                                                                             
 161. See Trevor C. Hartley, Accession and Bilateral Agreements, in THE HAGUE 
CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS 110 (Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. 
Silberman eds., 2001) (defining bilateralization). For an overview of the benefits and 
downfalls of bilateralization, see Lindsay Loudon Vest, Note, Cross-Border Judgments 
and the Public Policy Exception: Solving the Foreign Judgment Quandary by Way of 
Tribal Courts, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 813 (2004). 
 162. See Vest, supra note 161, at 814. 
 163. See Standeford, supra note 16 (suggesting that there is no point in having the 
Convention if countries such as China and Russia do not join the Convention). 
 164. Article 24(b) states that the Secretary General of the HCIPL shall: “make ar-
rangements for: …b) consideration of whether any amendments to this Convention are 
desirable.” Convention, supra note 3, art. 24(b). 
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force.165 The survey of case law above shows that the public policy ex-
ception is a very narrow exception and is usually only recognized in in-
stances where there is a violation of a larger state or national public pol-
icy, such as a constitutional violation166 or when the court feels there was 
a purposeful evasion of U.S. laws.167 Even in cases where there are dif-
ferences of procedural or substantive laws, courts have not been willing 
to recognize the public policy exception.168 The fact that a contract was 
not negotiated is not a major concern of courts either since there has his-
torically been an acceptance of agreements that are entered into freely.169 
In sum, the public policy exception, based on precedent, is not likely to 
provide much protection for at-risk organizations when it comes to non-
negotiated contracts. Libraries, small business, and other organizations 
that frequently transact via non-negotiated contracts can and should con-
tinue to lobby Congress and voice their concerns over the inclusion of 
non-negotiated contracts, even though it is unlikely that the U.S. will 
make a declaration excluding non-negotiated contracts. If the Convention 
is ratified by the U.S. and numerous other States, those at-risk can al-
ways refuse to make purchases online until the Convention is modified 
or the drafters of the non-negotiated contracts modify their forum-
selection clause. Although this option is not ideal, it is a way for those 
concerned by the inclusion of non-negotiated contracts within the Con-
vention to protect themselves. 
Keri Bruce* 
                                                                                                             
 165. It would feel obligated to enforce because of the requirements under article 8 and 
9 of the Convention and out of principles of comity set out in Hilton v. Guyot. See supra 
notes 9, 34, 45–52. 
 166. See Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 6. 
 167. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 931; See generally supra Part III.A.2. 
 168. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 169. See supra note 119. See generally supra Part III.B. 
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